The never ending war in the stack and the reincarnation of ROP attacks by Nader, Ammari et al.
The never ending war in the stack and the reincarnation of ROP attacks
Ammari Nader, Joan Calvet, Jose M. Fernandez
Abstract— Return Oriented Programming (ROP) is a tech-
nique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior inside
a vulnerable program without injecting a malicious code. The
continues failure of the currently deployed defenses against
ROP has made it again one of the most powerful memory
corruption attacks. ROP is also considered as one of the most
flexible attacks, its level of flexibility, unlike other code reuse
attacks, can reach the Turing completeness. Several efforts have
been undertaken to study this threat and to propose better
defense mechanisms (mitigation or prevention), yet the majority
of them are not deeply reviewed nor officially implemented.
Furthermore, similar studies show that the techniques proposed
to prevent ROP-based exploits usually yield a high false-
negative rate and a higher false-positive rate, not to mention the
overhead that they introduce into the protected program. The
first part of this research work aims at providing an in-depth
analysis of the currently available anti-ROP solutions (deployed
and proposed), focusing on inspecting their defense logic and
summarizing their weaknesses and problems. The second part
of this work aims at introducing our proposed Indicators Of
Compromise (IOCs) that could be used to improve the detection
rate of ROP attacks. The three suggested indicators could detect
these attacks at run-time by checking the presence of some
artifacts during the execution of the targeted program. We
also proposed a measurement technique that allows measuring
these indicators at run-time. The last part of this work covers
the subject of the experimental phase. More specifically, the
Proof of Concept performed with the objective of proving the
effectiveness of our proposed indicators, as well as the proposed
measurement technique. The results of this experimental phase
show that only the first two indicators are able to detect ROP
attacks. Another important finding was about the non-expected
ROP features discovered and visualized during the experiment.
These features could be used to strengthen our indicators in
future works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, computer programs have become
an integral part of our society. Unfortunately, these programs
are known to contain some errors and imperfections which
could be exploited by attackers to achieve malicious opera-
tions. The most worrisome scenarios are those during which
an error is exploited with the goal of gaining full control over
the program. In this case, the attacker becomes able to fully
control the targeted program, and may as well control the ma-
chine that executes it and all the connected devices. From a
technical perspective, these attacks usually rely on corrupting
the program’s memory to force the execution to deviate and
execute the malicious code instead of the program’s code[1].
Traditionally, attackers have been achieving this by injecting
the malicious code somewhere in the program’s memory
before deviating the execution towards it. These attacks are
referred to as “code injection attacks”. The injection method
varies from one attack to another depending on the situation
and the attacked program. Well known examples of this
include injecting the malicious code inside the user inputs.
More creative injection techniques could even involve the use
of side-channel attacks such as relaying on electromagnetic
waves or sound waves to remotely deliver and inject the
malicious payload[2]. A profusion of defense mechanisms
has been proposed, engineered and implemented to stop this
kind of “code injection attacks”. To date, the most effective
defense against code injection attacks is known as “Data
Execution Prevention” (DEP)[3]. This defense prevents code
injection attacks by simply making some memory locations
non-executable. By doing this, it can guarantee that if an
attacker injects any code, he will never be able to execute it.
DEP has been integrated not only by the majority of operat-
ing systems but also by hardware manufacturers. The great
success of DEP made hackers unable to perform traditional
“code injection attacks”. However, the wide adoption of DEP
has forced attackers to invent and use new techniques, one
of these newly engineered techniques proposes reusing code
and functions from inside the targeted program to build the
malicious payload instead of injecting new code[4][5], hence
the name “code reuse attacks”. The possibility of reusing a
program’s code to build an attack was both a shocking fact
and an unexpected trick that may be compared (strategically)
to a “cancer” where body cells start attacking themselves.
The tremendous success of code reuse attacks made them
one of the top security concerns and one of the most potent
cross-platform weapons[4]. Originally, these code reuse at-
tacks focused on re-utilizing the code of whole functions.
However, from an attacker perspective, reusing the entire
function was not providing enough flexibility to build the
desired malicious code. For that reason, a new customized
version of code reuse attacks was designed. This version
dubbed “Return Oriented Programming attacks”(ROP) [6]
proposes reusing small pieces of code instead of reusing an
entire function’s code. These small chunks of code could be
located inside libraries code (loaded by the program) or the
program’s code, and they are chained together using the Ret
instruction [7] which should be located at the end of each
chunk. To date, ROP is considered as one of the most so-
phisticated and flexible “code reuse attacks”[8]. Furthermore,
Homescu et al. [9] proved that the level of flexibility offered
by ROP attacks could achieve the Turing completeness,
making attackers able to perform more powerful attacks and
obviating the need for injecting codes. This powerful code
breaking strategy inspired hackers to create similar versions
like “Jump Oriented Programming” (JOP) attacks[10].
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II. THE PRIMARY DEFENSES ARE COLLAPSING
As a solution to mitigate memory corruption attacks, a new
defense mechanism was designed and implemented inside
the majority of operating systems. This mechanism is known
as “Address Space Layout Randomization” (ASLR)[11].
ASLR was originally designed to mitigate the old versions
of code injection, however, it does also make ROP attacks
harder to exploit. Based on the research work provided by
Carlini and Wagner [8], ASLR could be considered as the
first defense line against ROP attacks. The main idea behind
ASLR is to load the program’s components in random mem-
ory locations, by doing so, attackers are no longer able to
reuse program’s code as they cannot predict its new location.
Unfortunately, ASLR is no longer able to mitigate memory
corruption attacks as attackers have been able to design new
circumvention techniques. The most straightforward bypass-
ing technique consists in finding a non-protected library
loaded by the targeted program. This problem is manly
related to the default settings of the widely used development
tools as they do not activate the randomization by default
during the compilation process. As an example, in Visual
Studio 2008, the developer has to explicitly add the flag
“/DYNAMICBASE” in order to compile an ASLR-protected
module. Furthermore, in Windows 8, the developer has to
specify a second flag named “/HIGHENTROPYVA” in addi-
tion to “/DYNAMICBASE” just to ensure that the entropy of
the randomization is high, this limitation made brute-force
attacks one of the most used techniques to bypass ASLR.
While testing the effectiveness of brute-forcing a function’s
address, the research team learned that the randomization for
some operating systems such as “Windows 8” is limited to
8 bits. In other words, an attacker can guess the protected
address after trying at maximum 28 = 256 tries. Memory
leak attacks are also used to bypass ASLR. From a general
perspective, hackers could rely on a format string attack or
simply forcing the program to print an error message to
extract/reveal the protected information. Return-to-plt attack
is another bypassing technique used to circumvent ASLR.
During this attack, the attacker calls the needed function
using its PLT[12] instead of its address, by doing so, he is
no longer forced to guess the unknown addresses. More ad-
vanced ASLR circumvention techniques propose relying on
hardware weaknesses which, unlike software weaknesses, are
known to be hard if not impossible to patch. A well-known
example of these hardware-based circumvention techniques
is the “ASLR and Cache” (AnC)[13] attack, introduced to
the public in late 2016. As its name indicates, AnC relies on
the cache hierarchy of the processor to disclose the needed
addresses and bypass ASLR. The effectiveness of AnC attack
has been proved against 22 CPU microarchitectures[13],
including the most recent architectures designed by Intel,
AMD, Samsung, Nvidia, and Allwinner. In addition, another
powerful hardware-based circumvention technique was pro-
posed in late 2016 by Evtyushkin et al. [14]. This technique
exploits a weakness in the branch target buffer (BTB) which
is used by modern processors to predict the target of a
branching operation. In their research paper, Evtyushkin et al.
explained how an attacker could bypass a Kernel ASLR
protection in 60 milliseconds by exploiting this weakness
in BTB. The apparition of the previously described attacks
(i.e. AnC and BTB attack) represented the end of ASLR
protection, leaving the cyberspace without any effective
defenses against advanced memory corruption attacks such
as ROP. Since then, the number of the successfully exploited
ROP attacks is becoming higher every year as shown in the
reports provided by the commune vulnerability and exposure
database[15]. The failure of ASLR defense is not the unique
worrisome fact, the second frightening fact is about how
attackers are escalating the use of ROP attacks to become
a cyber-espionage weapon used in advanced targeted attacks
and state-sponsored attacks. A well-known example of this is
the Operation Clandestine Wolf[16] performed by a China-
based threat group known as “APT3”. During this operation,
a ROP attack was used to launch a large-scale spying cam-
paign against aerospace companies, defense organizations,
construction companies, engineering companies, high-tech
malefactors, and even transportation companies. Operation
Greedywonk[17] is another example of rop-based cyber-
espionage campaign, during which, hundreds of economic
and foreign policy sites were compromised for more than
two years, and were spreading the infection to some targeted
high-profile personalities without being detected. In the ab-
sence of effective defenses against ROP attacks, and because
of the previously-stated escalation in its use, ROP attacks
may be viewed as a serious security threat. The existence of
such threats heightened the need for new defenses. Therefore,
academia has shown an increased interest in studying ROP
attacks and proposing new alternatives and solutions. A quick
scan of the literature confirms that a profusion of research on
ROP attacks has been published, though the majority of them
have not been deeply reviewed or officially implemented.
III. THE SECONDARY DEFENSES ARE NOT HOLDING
WELL
A. STACK COOKIE
Stack Cookies[18] is one of the oldest defense techniques
against memory corruption attacks. It is nearly supported by
every operating system (e.g. Windows, Linux and Mac Os )
and usually referred to as canaries protection. This protection
is implemented at the compiler level, and it is focusing
on securing the return addresses. During the compilation
process, the compiler adds some extra pieces of code to the
protected function. The main task of the injected codes is
to guarantee the integrity of the stack. More specifically, the
protection is performed by injecting a randomly generated
4 bytes known as a cookie, this cookie is usually injected
between the local variables and the return address of the
protected function. The original copy of this cookie is called
program-wide master cookie which is saved in the .data
segment. During the functions epilogue, the injected cookie
is compared again with the original one. If the two compared
values are not matching the operating system concludes that
the integrity of the stack is violated. From an attackers
perspective, it is impossible to overwrite the return address
without corrupting the value of the injected cookie. The main
reasons behind the failure of this security mechanism are the
deployment cost and the restrictions applied by the majorities
of the compilers. Previous studies have confirmed these facts,
such as the one conducted by Dang et al. [19]. Dang et al.
explained in their research paper that the deployment of stack
cookies comes with a high price, additional codes are being
injected into every protected function, forcing the program to
execute additional calculations at the beginning and the end
of every function, without mentioning the additional stack
storage reserved to save all cookie values. Furthermore, the
restrictions imposed by compilers are playing an important
role in this failure, in other words, the majority of the
compilers are not activating this protection in so many cases
such as when the protected function is not declaring any
stack buffers, when a function is marked with naked, when
the argument list of the function is variable or when the
optimization is disabled. From an attacker’s perspective, the
easiest way to bypass Stack Cookies protection is to start
by auditing the targeted program in order to locate some of
these non-protected functions. Even if the program is well
protected and all its internal functions are protected, hackers
still able to exploit these exceptions by relying on external
vulnerable dependencies (e.g. loaded libraries) in order to
find these non-protected functions. Another bypassing tech-
nique proposes the use of brute-force attack and trying all
the possible combinations. On a 32bit system, the canary
field is composed by four random bytes, however, the first
one is always null [20], making the maximum number of
trials equal to 8 388 608. Based on the study conducted by
Marco-Gisbert and Ripoll [20], this number of combinations
could be brute-forced in few hours. Furthermore, it has been
proven that stack cookies could be brute-forced in less than
one minute using an advanced brute-force attack known
as “Byte-for-byte brute force”[21]. During this attack, the
number of the needed trials is decreased to 768, Marco-
Gisbert and Ripoll [20] discussed this attack in their research
paper and said: ”The attack consists in overwriting only the
first byte of the canary until the child does not crash. All the
values from 0 to 255 are tested sequentially until a success is
got. The last byte tested is the first byte of the canary. The
remaining bytes of the canary are obtained following the
same strategy. This kind of bug is very dangerous because
a system is broken with only 3256 = 768 trials. Finally,
memory leak attacks could also be used to circumvent Stack
Cookies protection. As an example, the attacker can use a
“format string attack”[22] to simply extract the value of the
cookie from the stack.
B. ASCII ARMOR
During code reuse attacks the attacker has to specify the
destination address after hijacking the control flow of the
program, this is usually done by injecting the destination
address after the payload that will trigger the overflow
and overwrite the instruction pointer value. The destination
address can not contain any null-byte character (i.e. 00) as
the majority of the vulnerable functions are assuming that
their inputs should terminate with a null-byte charter. ASCII-
Armor is exploiting the previously described fact to mitigate
ROP attacks and other similar code reuse attacks. When
this mitigation technique is enabled, all the system libraries
(e.g. Libc) are loaded in a particular addresses that contains
null-bytes, making the attacker unable to reuse functions or
gadgets from these libraries. The main problem of ASCII-
Amor protection, is that it can be easily circumvented using
PLT tables [12] and use a function’s PLT instead of its
address[12]. Another bypassing technique consists in using
machine instructions to build/construct the protected address
without explicitly using the null character. Further more, it
is always possible to find several non protected libraries.
C. DATA EXECUION PREVENTION
The first approach adopted by attackers to defeat Data
Execution Prevention (DEP) is to exploit some specific
functions able to modify the DEP policy. On Windows
platforms, the best known DEP bypass function is Virtu-
alAlloc. Stojanovski et al. [23] demonstrated the use of
VirtualAlloc to bypass DEP, the attack consists on using
this function to create a new executable memory region
where the malicious code could be injected and executed. In
other words, it allows the creation of non-protected memory
space. HeapCreate is also a similar function that provides
the same privileges as VirtualAlloc. Furthermore, there are so
many similar functions such as VirtualProtect, WriteProcess-
Memory, SetProcessDEPPolicy, SetProcessDEPPolicy and
ZwProtectVirtualMemory, they are also able to manipulate
the Data Execution Prevention policy and could be used to
bypass this security mechanism.
The second approach used by hackers to bypass DEP
proposes the exploitation of the DEP misconfiguration. More
specifically, DEP could be functional under four possible
modes. The first mode is referred to as OptIn Mode where
only a limited set of binaries are protected. The second mode
is referred to as OptOut Mode where all binaries on the
system are protected, except the programs specified in the
exception list. The third mode is referred to as AlwaysOff
Mode where DEP is disabled for all binaries. The forth mode
is known as AlwaysOn Mode Where all binaries on the
system are protected with no exception. The OptIn Mode is
usually circumvented by relying on a non-protected binary.
The OptOut Mode is usually bypassed by first gaining access
to the exception list, then using one of the binaries specified
in this list to perform the attack. When the AlwaysOff Mode
is activated, the attacker can use any binary in the system
to perform the attack as all of them are not protected. If
the AlwaysOn Mode is activated, the attacker can rely on
the previously described functions such as VirtualAlloc and
Heapcreate to create a non-protected memory space. In addi-
tion, all kinds of code-reuse-attacks such as Return Oriented
Programming, Jump Oriented Programming, Ret-to-libc or
Ret-to-PLT can circumvent DEP as they are not injecting
any codes. Actually, code reuse attacks have been engineered
with the goal of bypassing this security mechanism.
D. SUMMARIZING THE WAR IN THE STACK
Figure ?? provides a detailed summary of the bypassing
techniques discussed previously in this work and used by
hackers to circumvent the currently deployed security mech-
anisms, the figure describes the link between all these attacks
and how they are chained together to achieve a successful
code execution attack.
IV. THE ACADEMIC PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR
LIMITATION
This section provides a detailed explanation of the most
important academic anti-ROP solutions studied during this
work, our study aimed at inspecting all the details of these
proposed defenses, the inspection went trough all the so-
lutions layers from the logic that they propose to the way
how they implemented this logic. The studied solutions were
classified in such a way that it becomes easier to compare
them, four categories have been proposed based on the
approach adopted by the authors. The first category discusses
the compiler level approaches where authors are exploiting
the compiler capabilities in order to defeat Return Oriented
Programming attacks. In this category, two solutions were
analyzed and detailed. The first solution was “G-Free”, which
proposes the application of some compiler-based patches
in order to prevent the non-authorized branching executed
during a ROP attack. The second solution was “Return-less
kernel”, this solution proposes the replacement of the x86
instruction “Ret” in order to prevent hackers from reusing
them to build the malicious gadgets. The second category
lists the solutions where “dynamic binary instrumentation”
is used to analyze the targeted binaries at run-time. The first
analyzed solution was “ROP-Defender”, it proposes the use
of a new concept named “Stack shadow”, which is a copy
of the regular stack used to detect the violation of the stack
integrity during a ROP attack. The second solution is named
DROP. It proposes translating the execution into an interme-
diate representation, then inspecting this representation and
looking for ROP signature, the proposed signature is similar
to the one proposed by our second indicator. However,
the manner and logic of counting the instructions are very
different. The third category is grouping the solutions where
the problem of ROP attacks is treated as a control-flow
violation problem. In this category, three solutions have been
studied and analyzed. The first solution was “ROPSTOP”,
its main idea consists in making sure that, after executing a
subroutine, the control gets back always to the caller. The
second solution we studied was “KBouncer”, which relies
on hardware features not only to verify that the control
flow is getting back to the right caller but also to the exact
right address. The last solution analyzed in this category
was “Control Flow Locking”, as its name indicates, this
solution proposes the injection of some locking/unlocking
codes inside the protected binary in order to prevent ROP
attacks from hijacking the control flow. The fourth category
is about the static binary rewriting approaches where the
protected binaries are rewritten in such a way that ROP
exploitation become harder. The studied example was “ILR
Instruction Location Randomization”, this solution proposes
changing the positions of all the instructions inside the Code
segment in order to thwart the hacker’s ability to locate the
needed gadgets.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN LIMITATIONS DISCOV-
ERED IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The inspection of the proposed academic solution revealed
several misconceptions problems which make them either
exposed to an easy circumvention or hard to deploy. As
an example, the encryption used by G-Free[24] is too weak
and could be broken easily (xor based encryption). Another
limitation of G-free is that it violates the integrity of the
protected binary which makes its deployment impossible
in the case of the digitally signed programs. One of the
main limitations discovered in “Return less Kernel”[25] was
related to the fact that it could be circumvented by simply
corrupting the “Return address table”, in addition, it is impos-
sible to implement such protection in the case of non-open
sourced operating systems as it requires recompiling the full
kernel. The limitations of ROP-Defender[26] were related to
the adopted assumptions. These assumptions are not correct
in the cases of exceptions, signals, interruptions and all goto-
like statements which makes its false positive rate very high.
A significant limitation was discovered in DROP[27], it is
related to the use of an abstract form of instructions stream
(an Intermediate Representation). Relying on an Intermediate
Representation (IR) to inspect the executed instructions will
introduce a huge delay and the attack will not be detected in
real-time (DROP has to execute the code then translate it to
an IR before being able to perform a static inspection of the
IR output). The logic adopted by ROPSTOP[28] also suffers
from significant limitations, it could be circumvented by us-
ing gadgets from the caller subroutine, and the false positive
rate is very high. The problems discovered in Ropecker[29]
and KBouncer[30] are mainly related to the use of the Last
Branching Records, these records are only able to capture
the last 16 branching operations and they could be flushed
by running garbage functions as demonstrated by Schuster
et al. [31]. Besides, the two solutions are only protecting
very specific functions believed to be “critical functions”,
and the attacker is still cappable of using the non-protected
functions to build the ROP chain. Furthermore, KBouncer
relies on the DetourDll in order to intercept the execution
of the protected functions, many viruses and malware use
this exact same DLL to perform malicious actions, therefore
it will be flagged as malicious by the majority of the anti-
virus products. The solution proposed by CFL[32] cannot be
applied in the case of packed binaries or self-modifying code
as the static extraction of the control flow graph is not always
possible in these cases. The solution proposed by ILR[33]
is violating the integrity of the program and could not be
applied in the case of the digitally signed programs.
V. THE PROPOSED INDICATORS TO DETECT ROP
As explained previously, our analysis of the deployed
defenses shows that they are unable to fully detect/mitigate
Fig. 1. The War In The Stack
ROP attacks. In addition, the analysis of the academic
proposed solutions presented previously shows that these
solutions need enhancements as they suffer from many
limitations such as deployment problems, high overhead,
low detection rate and the majority of them could be easily
circumvented. The absence of effective protections against
ROP attacks heightened the need for new defenses, thus,
we propose three indicators of compromise which could be
used to detect ROP attacks at runtime, these indicators could
be considered as a meta-data generated unwillingly by the
ROP attack, and their existence indicates the presence of such
attacks. The first indicator proposes the inspection of every
Ret[7] and Call[7] instruction being executed by the program.
From a general perspective, it relies on the fact that ROP
attacks will prevent these instructions from performing their
normal tasks[6]. The proposed indicator is defining this ab-
normal behaviour and how is could be observed. The second
proposed indicator focuses on inspecting every instruction
being executed between two consecutive Ret[7] instructions.
The idea is also about detecting the violation of some specific
conditions that must hold true when executing codes located
between two Ret instructions. The last indicator focuses on
the variation of the Instruction Pointer[7]. More specifically,
it proposes the inspection of this variation with the goal of
identifying any abnormal patterns that could be introduced
by ROP attacks.
A. Ret/Call parity indicator
Programs often rely on subroutines to perform some
tasks such as reading users inputs, updating a database or
performing calculations. In order to be able to call these
subroutines, programs usually rely on the x86 assembly
instruction Call[7]. This instruction interrupts the main exe-
cution, saves the address of the interruption onto the stack,
then transfers the control to the called subroutine. When a
subroutine ends, the program needs to resume the previous
execution from where it was interrupted, therefore it relies on
the Ret[7] instruction located at the end of each subroutine
to read the previously saved address then jump to it. This
mechanism shows perfectly how Call and Ret are always
paired together and how Call instruction is always executed
before the Ret as shown in Figure 2.
Call and Ret could be executed in two possible ways,
the first one is when two subroutines are called one after
the other (in sequence). The second way is when the first
subroutine calls the second one (recursively). Figure 3 shows
how Call and Ret would be organized in both cases.
Fig. 2. Ret/Call logic
Fig. 3. Ret/Call possible execution order
Based on the previous explanation, it becomes obvious
that in both cases and at any moment during the execution,
the number of the executed Call should be higher or equal
to the number of the executed Ret. However, this fact does
not hold true during a ROP attack as it interrupts the normal
execution and forces the program to execute gadgets which
only contain Ret instructions[6]. It can therefore be assumed
that the number of the executed Ret will increase until
becoming higher than the number of the executed Call as
explained in Figure 4.
The proposed indicator exploits the previously described
anomaly introduced by ROP attacks to identify the mali-
cious execution. More specifically, we propose monitoring
the number of the executed Ret and Call at run-time and
comparing them to make sure that they reflect the legitimate
behaviour, where the number of the executed Call is always
higher or equal to the number of the executed Ret.
B. Executed instructions between two Ret
The number of the instructions executed by a subroutine
depends on the complexity of the performed tasks, the man-
ner in which it was implemented and the optimization per-
formed by the compiler during the compilation process[34].
However, nearly any subroutine must contain at least five to
ten necessary instructions, these instructions are responsible
for first preparing the stack when the subroutine starts,
second cleaning the stack and restoring it to its original state
Fig. 4. ROP gadgets makes the number of the executed Rets higher than
the number of the executed Calls
when the subroutine ends. These processes are known as
function prologue[7] and function epilogue[7].
Fig. 5. Function Prologue and Epilogue
Figure 5 represents an example of a typical prologue
and epilogue, the first three lines of code are the function
prologue, it starts by pushing the current base pointer ebp[7]
onto the stack so that the program can restore it later. The
second line in the prologue writes the value of the stack
pointer esp[7] into the ebp in order to create a new stack
frame on top of the old one. The third line of code is taking
care of creating the space for the function’s local variables.
Depending on the architecture, the esp could be decreased or
increased, if the stack is growing down, which is the case for
the x86 arch, then the esp should be decreased as shown in
the third line of the prologue. The last two lines of code are
the function epilogue, this is where the stack gets cleaned.
The first line of code in the epilogue restores the previously
saved esp, while the second line is taking care of restoring
the value of the base pointer ebp. In addition, besides the
prologue and the epilogue, a subroutine must contain some
core instructions, they are related to the execution of the main
tasks, and they should be located between the prologue and
the epilogue. The total number of the executed instructions in
a subroutine is composed of these core instructions plus the
epilogue and the prologue. Based on the facts presented thus
far, the total number of the executed instructions between
two Ret should not be so small and must always stay a bit
high, more specifically higher than five. However, this does
not hold true during a ROP attack since it is executing a small
number of instructions[6]. According to [6], this number
could vary from three to five instructions. This indicator
proposes checking the number of the executed instructions
between two successive Ret and making sure that this number
is higher than five, if not, then it shouldn’t stay less than five
for more than three constitutive Ret as the minimum number
of gadgets that can be found in a ROP chain is three[27].
It is also important to point to the fact that there are some
exceptions where a subroutine does not contain an epilogue
or a prologue, such as leaf functions and naked functions[35].
If the number of the core instructions executed by these
functions is so small, they may introduce false positive alerts
in this indicator.
C. Instruction pointer variation
The code of a program is composed of a set of instructions.
At run-time, they are loaded in a specific memory location
known as ”code segment” (CS)[7]. More specifically, the
“loader” reads the contents of the executable and writes it
into the code segment from where they will be executed.
These instructions are executed one by one, after executing
every instruction the program decides what should be the
next instruction and jumps to its address, this address is
always stored in a register (processor register) called the
Instruction Pointer (IP). This pointer is updated after exe-
cuting any instruction[7]. It is a widely held view that the
variation of this pointer, the distribution of the executed
instructions and the order and the time of their execution
is completely random, but this is not true. In fact, they
obey to some fundamental principles such as the “Temporal
locality” and the “Spatial locality”. These two principles
were introduced by Denning [36] in late 2006, now days
they could be considered as a fundamental concepts used by
every hardware manufacturer for optimization purposes. The
temporal locality refers to the reuse of the same memory
address within a small period of time, in other words, if a
memory address is used in the present, it is more likely that
the same address will be reused again in the near future.
Denning [36] defined the spatial locality as the use of very
close addresses, in other words, if a memory address is used,
it is more likely that nearby addresses will be used in the
near future. Kleen et al. [37] also studied these principles and
explained well the difference between good locality and poor
locality. The “Temporal locality” and the “Spatial locality”
are not the only rules that organize and influence the executed
instructions and their distribution, the set of optimizations
applied by compilers is also making the execution of the
legitimate code more unique. The “size optimization” is one
of these optimization where the assembly code is modified
to maximize the code cache and improve the decoding time,
this type of optimization involves the use of the shortest
instructions, as an example, “add eax,1000” is used instead of
“add ebx,1000” as it takes one byte less. Other examples of
“size optimisation” involve using shorter addresses or excep-
tionally making instructions longer for the sake of alignment.
[38] [38] explained hundreds of other optimization rules
applied by compilers where the assembly code is modified,
rearranged and placed in specific regions in order to improve
its performance. The main idea of this indicator relies behind
the fact that the malicious code executed during a ROP attack
is different from what a normal compiler would generate as
it does not obey to any rules or lows, this is because it is
composed of random sequences of instructions chosen by the
attacker instead of being generated by a compiler. During
the execution of this malicious code, the instruction pointer
points to the addresses of the gadgets instead of pointing
to the program’s code, it can therefore be assumed that the
IP variation will be also different during a ROP attack as
it reflects what has been executed. This indicator proposes
monitoring the variation of this pointer and tries to identify
any unusual variation or patterns that may be linked to the
execution of ROP attack.
D. architecture of the detection engine
From a general perspective, the proposed architecture is
composed of three modules as shown in Figure 6. Each
module is responsible for performing a specific task.
Fig. 6. Global architecture of the detection engine
As shown in Figure 6, module (1) is named “Input
preparator”, it is taking care of triggering the executable and
providing the needed inputs depending on the experiment
type: Running malicious executions or Running legitimate
programs. In the case of studying the malicious behaviour
of ROP attacks, the Input preparator executes the vulnerable
program, chooses a malicious ROP chain and trigger the
attack. In the case of studying the legitimate behaviour
of a program, the Input preparator executes one of the
programs from the listed programs, then provides it with
the needed input (parameters). During the execution of the
analyzed program, Module (2) takes care of performing the
needed measurements, it performs a different measurement
depending on the studied indicator. The results are saved
into execution traces, hence the name “Trace generator”, it
is important to mention that a separated trace is generated
separately for each thread running under the analyzed pro-
gram. Module (3) is called the “Trace analyzer”. As its name
indicates, this module is responsible for analyzing the traces
generated by the “Trace generator”. The analysis process
performed by this module consists in running the detection
logic proposed by the studied indicator. The implementation
of Module (2) and Module (3) (Trace generator and Trace
analyzer) depends on the indicator’s logic, therefore, both of
them should be customized to fit the needs of each indicator.
In other words, there is three different versions of Module
(2) and three different versions of Module (3), however, the
same implementation of Module (1) could be used for the
three indicators.
1) Trace generator & Trace analyzer: Ret/Call parity :
The first versions of the Trace generator and the Trace
analyzer are designed for studying the first indicator. This
indicator monitors the number of the executed Ret and Call
at run-time and compares them to make sure that the number
of the executed Call is always higher than the number of
the executed Ret. The logic of the first version of the Trace
generator is detailed in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Trace generator: Ret/Call parity
As shown in Figure 7, step (1) consists in staying idle
until the execution of a new instruction. During step (2),
the module checks the current context to identify the thread
in question using the unique thread ID attributed by the
system. The process of identifying the thread that executes
the instruction is important as a separated trace should be
generated for each thread. Step (3) consists on inspecting
the instruction’s opcode. If the opcode corresponds to a Call
opcode, the module increments the Call counter (5.1) and
updates the trace (6). If the opcode corresponds to a Ret
opcode, the module increments the Ret counter (5.2), then
updates the execution trace (6). If the opcode does not match
either Ret or Call, the instruction will be ignored and the
module remains unresponsive until the execution of another
instruction. The logic of the of Trace analyzer consists on
running the verification proposed by the indicator, which
could be performed in the three steps shown in Figure 7. Step
(1) consists on waiting for a new trace update. The content
of this update is inspected in step (2) to make sure that the
number of the executed Call is higher than the number of
the executed Ret. If not, the Trace analyzer raises an alert
about a ROP attack being executed (3).
Fig. 8. Trace analyzer: Ret/Call parity
2) Trace generator & Trace analyzer: Executed instruc-
tions between two Ret : The second versions of the Trace
analyzer and the Trace generator are designed for the indi-
cator that focuses on analyzing the number of the executed
instructions between two consecutive Ret. The logic of the
Trace generator module is detailed in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Trace generator: Executed instructions between two Ret
As shown in Figure 9, step (1) consists on staying idle until
the execution of a new instruction, whenever an instruction
is executed, the module identifies the thread in question
using the unique thread ID (2). During step (3), the module
inspects the instruction’s opcode. If the instruction being
executed is Ret (4.1), the module saves the value of the
instruction counter and starts a new one (5.1). The previously
saved counter is stored in the execution trace during the 6th
step. If the opcode corresponds to a branching instruction
(4.2), e.g., Call, Jmp, Ja, Jb or Je, the module resets the
counter to zero without updating the trace (5.2). Resetting
this counter each time a branching instruction is executed, is
an important process as gadgets are not supposed to contain
any branching instruction[6]. If the opcode of the executed
instruction does not match either Ret or any branching
instruction, the module increments the instruction counter
(4.3), then remains unresponsive until the execution of the
next instruction. Regarding the Trace analyzer, the main
logic consists on performing the verification proposed by
the second indicator. More specifically, making sure that the
number of the executed instructions between two consecutive
Ret is higher than five. If it is smaller than five, then it
shouldn’t stay that way for more than three consecutive Ret.
Figure 10 describes the different steps performed by the trace
analyzer. Step (1) consists on waiting for a new trace update.
Step (2) consists on checking the updated trace and making
sure that the number of the executed instructions between the
last two Ret is higher than five. If not, the module increments
the number of the suspected gadgets (3). During step (4), the
module makes sure that the total number of the consecutive
suspected gadgets is less than three. If not, it raises an alert
about ROP attack being executed (5).
Fig. 10. Trace analyzer: Executed instructions between two Ret
3) Trace generator: Instruction pointer variation : The
third version of the Trace generator is designed to study the
third proposed indicator. This indicator focuses on studying
the variation of the instruction pointer with the goal of
identifying any unusual patterns to related the execution
of ROP attacks. However, the indicator is not defining any
specific patterns, therefore, it is not possible to architect a
Trace analyzer module for this indicator. At this stage, the
analysis process could be achieved manually, by inspecting
the generated traces and trying to identify any possible
patterns that may be linked to the execution of ROP attacks.
This version of the Trace generator monitors the variation
of the instruction pointer, extracts the address of every
executed instruction then saves it in an execution trace for
later analysis. This module also generates a separated trace
for each thread. Figure 11 presents the previously described
logic.
Fig. 11. Trace generator: Instruction pointer variation
VI. THE PROOF OF CONCEPT
This part of the work aims to introduce the Proof of
Concept (PoC) performed during this research work. This
PoC was realized with the goal of evaluating the correctness
of our hypothesis and testing the effectiveness of the three
proposed indicators, the proposed measurement technique
and the proposed implementation technology (Pin frame-
work). The first part of this section aims to introduce the
reasons behind choosing the implementation technology as
well as the experimental logic and setup. This part provides
a detailed description of the main concept of the experiments
as well as the data used during the PoC. This data represents
the experimental input, and it could be categorized into two
categories: the legitimate executions and the malicious exe-
cutions. During the experiments, a set of tools was developed
to perform some specific tasks such as the auto-generation
of ROP attacks or the auto-repetition of the experiment
with different data. A detailed description of these tools is
also included in the first part of this chapter. The second
part of this chapter takes care of summarizing and listing
the results of the experimental phase. The results of each
indicator were summarized in two main tables. The first table
describes the results obtained after launching the 730 ROP
attacks while the second table summarizes the experimental
results collected after running the legitimate executions. A
summary of the false positive and negative rates of each
indicator was also presented in this part. The last part of this
chapter aims to analyze and discuss the obtained results. The
most important observations and findings are commented and
detailed in this part. The false positive rate, the false negative
rate, the confusion matrix, the accuracy and the error rate
were also analyzed and discussed in this part. The possible
causes of the false positive alerts and the false negative alerts
are also discussed in this part.
A. The implementation technology
As discussed previously, the measurement techniques re-
quire the access to some critical run-time variables with a
very high frequency (whenever an instruction is executed).
Accessing such critical data with this frequency at run-time
is not an easy task, hence the need for an exploitative phase
before choosing the suitable technology to implement the
measurement techniques. We considered three possible tech-
nologies that may be able to implement the needed tasks, and
we performed an exploitative phase during which we were
able to have a better idea about their performance as well
as their effectiveness and ability to extract the needed data
with the needed frequency. The first explored technique was
the multipurpose debugger proposed by Microsoft, known as
”WinDBG”[39]. More specifically, we wanted to take advan-
tage of the ”Trace and Watch utility” presented in WinDBG.
This utility can trace the execution flow and extract in-
formation at the instruction level. It consists of a multi-
debugging process, during which the debugger disassembles
the currently executed function and places breakpoints on
each Call/Ret inside this function. If the execution hits one
of these breakpoints, the debugger disassembles the called
function and places the needed breakpoints. By repeating
this process recursively, WinDBG becomes able to extract
all the needed information (e.g. instruction’s opcode and
function’s name). During the exploitative phase, we have
discovered several limitations of this solution. One of the
main limitations was the huge overhead introduced during
the debugging process. Another noteworthy limitation was
related to the fact that WinDBG needs the PDB files1 of
the analyzed program which is not always available. The
second explored technology was a hardware-based solution.
This was the new feature introduced in recent processors
and known as ”Last Branch Recording (LBR)”[40]. When
this feature is enabled, the CPU records the information
about the last executed branching operations in special
registers named ”MSRs”. Among the logged information
we can find the destination address and the source address
as well as the branching instruction (e.g. Jump, Call and
Ret). This logging process is performed simultaneously while
executing the program without causing any considerable
slowdown. However, there still is some performance penalty
for reading these MSRs. Our exploitative phase revealed that
we could not rely on such technology to implement the
needed measurement techniques because of the discovered
limitations. The most critical limitations are related to the
quantity and the quality of the provided information. More
specifically, an LBR stack is limited to only 16 entries
(only the last 16 branching operations are recorded) and it
can be configured to only track specific types of branches.
Another significant limitation is related to the fact that LBR
1these files are generated from the program’s source code. They are
usually generated during the compilation process.
can only be activated and accessed from kernel mode, this
may not cause a problem for a research work but it can be
considered as a significant disadvantage if the solution is
meant to serve an end user. The third and the last explored
technology was the Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI).
More specifically, we explored a lightweight Dynamic Binary
Instrumentation framework known as “Pin”[41]. DBI is a
method used to analyze the behaviour of a binary appli-
cation at run-time. This analysis is performed through the
injection of some instrumentation code inside the program.
The injected code executes as part of the program. Pin is
known to be one of the most flexible binary instrumentation
frameworks as it offers the ability to instrument the program
at three different stages: Source code, Static executable level
(before execution), Dynamic executable level (during the
execution). Furthermore, Pin is capable of performing the
instrumentation at four different levels: instruction level, the
basic block level, the routine level and the image level. Our
exploitative phase revealed more important advantages of Pin
such as the Multiplatform support which allows the use of
Pin not only in different OSs like Windows, Linux, OSX,
Android or IOS but also in different architectures like IA-32
and Intel64. However, Pin also has some drawbacks such as
the considerable overhead introduced when the instruction
level granularity is activated. Table I compares the explored
technologies and summarizes the discovered facts during this
exploitative phase.
TABLE I
TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON
As shown in Table I, it is impossible to rely on Windbg to
implement our solution, first because it introduces an unac-
ceptable overhead and second because it requires the access
to the source code of the targeted program which could be
unavailable in the majority of cases. The exploitative phase
revealed some critical limitations in LBR. The information
extracted is limited quantitatively and qualitatively, LBR is
capable of only inspecting the last 16 branches (this number
can vary depending on the CPU generation but still always
smaller than 32 which is in Skylake CPUs), furthermore,
LBR can not inspect all types of branching operations, hence
the qualitative limitation. Given these limitations, LBR can
not be used to implement our solution. The facts discovered
during the exploitative phase and presented in Table I,
prove that the best technology to implement our proposed
measurement techniques would be Pin. Pin was the most
flexible technology that we explored, it offers different stages
and levels of instrumentation, it does not require the access
to any side information such as source code or PDB files,
it allows the inspection of any run-time variable and it is
a multi-platform solution that could be used in different
OSs and architectures. Based on the previously described
advantages, we decided to rely on Pin framework in order to
implement the main functionalists of the proposed solution.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC & SETUP
The effectiveness of the proposed solution should be
proved experimentally, this could be done by running ROP
attacks against the vulnerable program and verifying whether
the proposed indicators were able to detect these attacks
or not. This kind of experiments can only reveal the false
negative rate of the proposed solution. In order to have an
idea about the false positive rate, we performed the same
experiments again using legitimate executions instead of the
malicious ones. Specifically, the first step of this experimen-
tal phase is to apply the measurement technique on malicious
executions. The second step consists on performing the same
experiments using the legitimate executions. The list of the
legitimate programs/executions is described in Subsection
VII-A. For each indicator, the experiment was repeated 1000
times using different executions, 730 are the malicious ROP
attacks executed against the vulnerable program, and 270
are the legitimate programs with no ROP attacks. In order to
facilitate the task of repeating these experiments, an autom-
atization tool has been developed, this tool is described in
VII-C. The first versions of the Trace generator and the Trace
analyzer (Subsection V-D.1), were implemented and used to
study the “Ret/Call parity” indicator. The second versions of
these modules (Subsection V-D.2), were implemented and
used to study the indicator that focuses on studying the
executed instructions between two consecutive Ret. The third
version of the Trace generator was used to generate the
execution traces for the indicator that studies the Instruction
pointer variation, at this stage, there is no trace analyzer
for this indicator. The implementation of these modules
respects the architectures detailed in Figure 6 and relies on
the technology chosen in Subsection VI-A.
A. The legitimate executions
In order to be able to calculate the false positive rate, the
proposed indicators should be tested while running legitimate
programs. To do so, we prepared a list of 270 executions
composed of different Linux programs with different pa-
rameters. All these legitimate programs were collected from
Kali2.0 OS (Debian Jessie OS, kernel version of 4.0.0). More
specifically these programs were collected from the standard
directory ”/bin”. By default, this directory usually contains
the needed binaries to ensure the minimal functionality of
the system. The full list of the used programs and their
parameters is presented in the Appendix A.
B. The malicious executions & The automated generation of
ROP attacks
In order to provide enough ROP attacks during this experi-
mental phase, we developed a Python tool named “Auto-rop-
generation-module”. This module was built based on ROP-
gadget [42], which is a well known software usually used by
hackers/pen-testers to search for gadgets inside binaries and
link them to build the ROP chain. We modified the source
code of ROPgadget in order to automatically generate several
ROP chains from the same binary, specifically, to generate
a set of 730 ROP chains. The process of generating new
ROP attacks using this tool is described in Figure 12. As
shown in this figure, the tool starts by using ROPgadget to
generate the first ROP chain. The second step is to inspect
every gadget in this chain and locate all similar gadgets.
In other words, for each gadget in the main chain, we try
to find the list of gadgets that can replace it. The list of
the newly discovered gadgets can be used to replace the
original gadgets in the main chain and build a new ROP
chain. By generating all the possible combinations of these
gadgets, we were able to provide enough ROP attacks for
the experimental phase. Figure 12 describes the previously
described logic used to generate these attacks. The main
limitation of this process is that the generated attacks are
performing the same computational operations, however, the
ROP chains are completely different as they use different
gadgets located in different addresses.
It is also important to mention that we used two different
sources to extract the new gadgets: the program’s code (Code
Segment) and the well-known C library ”Libc” which is
loaded by the vulnerable program. By doing so, we guarantee
better diversity in the malicious sampling set. The generated
attacks should be executed against a vulnerable program.
Therefore, a simple vulnerable C program has been pro-
posed, this program performs some random computational
operations using some C functions. Among these functions,
there is the well known ”memcpy”, which copies the input
to a memory destination without doing bounds checking.
First, memcpy reads the input, and then it saves it into a
destination buffer. The typical exploitation technique consists
on providing a large input for this function, larger than
the destination buffer size. The large input will exceed the
buffers bounds and overwrite adjacent information such as
functions return address.
C. The automatisation tool
This tool was built in order to facilitate the task of
repeating these experiments with different inputs. It allows
the coordination between the four main modules: the Input
preparator, the Trace generator, the Trace analyzer and
the Auto-rop-generation-module. The tool was built using
Python 2.7. Figure 13 illustrates the logic of this module.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Results of the first indicator: Ret/Call parity analysis
As discussed, the experiment was performed against two
types of executions: Malicious and legitimate. The trace
generator took care of generating the traces and the trace
analyzer analyzed them in order to decide whether a ROP
attack is being executed or not. The left side of Figure 14
shows an example of a legitimate trace generated by our trace
Fig. 12. ROP auto-generation logic
Fig. 13. Automatisation module
generator. The same trace was regenerated while performing
a ROP attack (the right side of Figure 14), as we can see in
the right side of Figure 14, when a ROP attack is triggered,
the number of the executed Ret is becoming higher than the
number of the executed Call, for that reason, it was flagged
as malicious by our trace analyzer module.
Fig. 14. Traces screen-shot
The first part consisted on repeating the experiment against
730 ROP attack in different conditions: different Gadget
sources, DEP on/off and ASLR on/off. During this phase,
30 ROP attack were generated using Gadgets from the
program’s code (The code segment), and 700 attacks were
constructed using gadgets from Libc. The overhead intro-
duced by our tools was also collected for further analysis.
The results of this experimental phase are summarized in
Table II.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE FIRST INDICATOR: MALICIOUS EXECUTIONS
Gadget Source Samples
Number
DEP ASLR Detected
* Code segment
(the program
code )
30 Disabled Disabled 100%
Libc 700 Disabled Disabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
30 Enabled Disabled 100%
Libc 700 Enabled Disabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
15 Disabled Enabled 100%
Libc 50 Disabled Enabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
15 Enabled Enabled 100%
Libc 50 Enabled Enabled 100%
The second part of this Proof of Concept consisted on
performing the same experiment using the legitimate execu-
tions instead of the vulnerable program and the ROP attacks.
Unlike the previous part, these experiments were performed
only with DEP activated and ASLR deactivated as the main
goal was to have an idea about the false positive rate. The
results of these tests are summarized in Table III.
TABLE III
RESULTS OF THE FIRST INDICATOR: LEGITIMATE EXECUTIONS
Samples number Detected
270 1.1%
The results presented in Tables II and III can be used to
construct the confusion matrix which summarizes the false
negative rate (FN) and true positive rate (TP). This matrix is
presented in Table IV.
TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX: FIRST INDICATOR
Detected as
Legitimate
Detected as
Malicious
Actually Le-
gitimate
TN = 267 FP = 3 N = 270
Actually
Malicious
FN = 0 TP = 730 P= 730
267 733 -
B. Results of the second indicator: Instructions number
between two Ret
In order to prove the effectiveness of the second proposed
indicator, we followed the same experimental logic described
previously, except that we used the second version of the
trace generator and the trace analyzer. The left side of
Figure 15 shows an example of a legitimate trace generated
by our trace generator, while the right side represents a
malicious trace flagged as ROP attack by our trace analyzer.
As shown in the malicious trace, during a ROP attack, the
number of the instructions executed between two Ret be-
comes small (smaller than five) when the attack is triggered,
this behaviour is captured by our trace analyzer module and
interpreted as ROP attack. The trace generator counts the
second executed Ret among the executed instructions, but the
trace analyzer takes this into consideration while performing
the detection. The address of every executed instruction was
also collected, this information could be useful for further
analysis.
This experiment was repeated 1000 times against different
executions. The same 730 ROP attacks and the same 270 le-
gitimate programs from the previous experiments were used
during this experimental phase. The malicious executions
were also performed in different conditions (different Gadget
sources, DEP on/off and ASLR on/off). The results of the
malicious executions are summarized in Table V.
The second phase consisted on testing the indicator against
the non-malicious executions, this kind of tests allows the
calculation of the false positive rate. The results of this
second phase are summarized in Table VI:
Fig. 15. Traces screen-shot
TABLE V
RESULTS OF THE SECOND INDICATOR: MALICIOUS EXECUTION
Gadget Source Samples
Number
DEP ASLR Detected
* Code segment
(the program
code )
30 Disabled Disabled 100%
Libc 700 Disabled Disabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
30 Enabled Disabled 100%
Libc 700 Enabled Disabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
15 Disabled Enabled 100%
Libc 50 Disabled Enabled 100%
Code segment
(the program
code )
15 Enabled Enabled 100%
Libc 50 Enabled Enabled 100%
The confusion matrix of this indicator is presented VII, it
was constructed using the results presented in Tables V and
VI.
C. Results of the third indicator: Analyzing the IP/EIP
variation
Unlike the previous indicators, at this stage, this one is
not proposing any exact patterns to be recognized, therefore,
it was not possible to perform a process of auto-detection
using a trace analyzer. However, the same experiments were
performed on this indicator, and the execution traces were
generated using the third version of the trace generator. These
traces were analyzed manually with the goal of proving the
existence of new patterns appearing in the IP variation when
a ROP attack is being executed. Figure 16 represents an
example from the generated traces, it describes the different
values assigned to the instruction pointer (IP or EIP) during
the execution. In other words, the trace contains the addresses
of the executed instructions.
The manual analysis of these traces revealed that the EIP
variation is indeed witnessing the apparition of new patterns
during a ROP attack. In order to make the analysis easier,
TABLE VI
RESULTS OF THE SECOND INDICATOR: LEGITIMATE EXECUTIONS
Samples number Detected
270 1.8%
TABLE VII
CONFUSION MATRIX: SECOND INDICATOR
Detected as
Legitimate
Detected as
Malicious
Actually Le-
gitimate
TN = 265 FP = 5 N = 270
Actually
Malicious
FN = 0 TP = 730 P= 730
265 735 -
some examples of the generated traces were plotted, Figure
17 and Figure 18 are presenting two different plotted exe-
cutions of the same program. The first one is the legitimate
execution and the second one is the malicious one. The new
patterns that appear during the malicious executions and their
causes will be discussed and analyzed in the next sections.
IX. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
A. Discussing the results of the first indicator: Ret/Call
parity analysis
After performing the experimental phase and taking a
closer look at the collected results, it becomes clear that
this indicator has an excellent effectiveness in detecting the
existence of ROP attacks as there was no false negative alerts.
However, the generalisability of these results is subject to
certain limitations. In order to generalize these results, the
same experiment has to be performed against a larger sam-
pling set that includes a variety of vulnerable programs and
a wider ROP chain set. In order to facilitate the analysis of
the obtained results, some examples of the generated traces
were plotted, figures 20 and 19 describe two plotted traces
of the same program, the first figure represents the trace
of the legitimate execution while the second one represents
the trace of the malicious execution obtained after running
a ROP attack. As shown in Figure 19, during a legitimate
execution, the number of the executed Call is always higher
than the number of the executed Ret.
As shown in Figure 20, when the exploit is triggered, the
number of the executed Ret starts to increase till exceeding
the number of the executed Calls. This behaviour reflects
exactly the logic used by our indicator to identify these
attacks. Another important observation was about the fact
that the number of the executed Calls keeps the same value
during the attack, this fact is logical as gadgets are not
supposed to contain a Call instruction. This fact was not
expected, but it is considered as one of the most important
observations and a possible future enhancement for this
Fig. 16. Trace screen-shot
Fig. 17. EIP variation during the legitimate execution
indicator in future works. Despite the good results, it is not
possible to guarantee that this indicator will always keep the
same false negative rate for any sampling set. In order to be
able to draw more generalized conclusions, a wider sampling
set should be used in future works, this sampling set should
contain more vulnerable programs tested with real word
ROP chain instead of the auto-generated attacks. However,
the concrete conclusion that can be drawn from the present
study is about the excellent effectiveness of this indicator
in detecting ROP attacks. There are two possible causes of
having a false negative alert triggered by this indicator:
• Exceptions are the first possible cause: Exceptions force
the program to jump and execute the exception code,
this jump will prevent the normal execution from hit-
ting/executing the Ret associated with the previously
executed Call. If this behaviour is repeated more than
the number of the gadgets used in the ROP chain, then
this indicator will fail in detecting the attack.
• Go-to statements are the second possible cause: Go-to
statements can force the program to jump to a new code
location without executing the Ret instruction associated
with the previously executed Call. If such behaviour is
repeated more than the number of the gadgets in the
ROP chain, then this indicator will fail in detecting the
attack.
The results presented in Table III show that this indicator
suffers from a false positive rate equal to 1.1%, three
executions were flagged as malicious, but they are not. One
Fig. 18. EIP variation during the malicious execution
Fig. 19. Legitimate Ret/Call
of the possible causes of these false positive alerts is when
the program jumps to the beginning of a function instead of
using the Call instruction. In other words, when the Call
instruction associated with the Ret is never executed, in
order to confirm this, a further reverse engineering process
should be performed against the flagged programs. The
confusion matrix of this indicator (previously presented in
Table IV) permits the calculation of the “Accuracy” and
the “Error Rate”, these rates describe how often the results
are correct and how often they are wrong. The ”Accuracy”
of this indicator is 0.997, and it could be calculated using
the Equation 1. Having an accuracy equal to 0.997 means
that the results of this indicator are correct at 99.7%. This
accuracy could be considered as very good as the best of the
56 VirusTotal AV engines has an accuracy 99.4%[43]. The
Error rate is equal to 0.003 and could be calculated using
the Equation 2. This value reflects the fact that the results
are wrong in 0.3% of the cases.
Accuracy = (T P+T N)/P+N (1)
ErrorRate = (FP+FN)/P+N (2)
B. Discussing the results of the second indicator: Instruc-
tions number between two Ret
As shown in Table V, the false negative rate is null. How-
ever, in order to draw a generalized conclusion about this
rate, further experiments must be performed against a wider
sampling set that includes the use of different vulnerable
programs and more diversified ROP chains. Regarding the
non-malicious executions, 1.8% of them were flagged as
Fig. 20. Malicous Ret/Call
malicious but they are not. The causes behind these false
positive alerts could be discovered by analyzing both the
execution traces generated by our tool and the dissembled
programs. One of the possible causes could be related to
the execution of a recursive loop containing a small number
of instructions (ex. incremental loop). In order to improve
the false positive rate in future work, an extra step of
verification could be added to this indicator, the verification
consists on checking if there are any patterns in the executed
instructions, if so, then this could be a loop as it repeats the
same instructions. Some examples of the generated traces
were plotted with the goal of having a better view of the
collected data, Figure 21 describes an example of a plotted
trace, this trace represents a legitimate execution of our
vulnerable program. Figure 22 represents the execution of
the same vulnerable program while running the ROP attack.
This figure demonstrates clearly that when the ROP chain
is triggered, the number of the instructions between two Ret
falls suddenly and becomes very small. Figure 23 is showing
better this behaviour after re-scaling the graph. First, the
plotted malicious execution starts with the same variation
as the legitimate one, then it witnesses the apparition of a
new pattern (Pattern 1). This pattern represents an unusual
behaviour generated by ROP attacks, during which the num-
ber of the instructions executed between two consecutive
Ret is raising highly before becoming small again. This
pattern was considered as an “artifact” that can help to
identify ROP attacks and could be added in future work to
improve the detection rate of this indicator. After inspecting
and analyzing this unexpected behaviour, we found that it is
generated by the large input used to trigger the overflow in
order to hijack the control flow. In other words, it is generated
by the memcpy function when it is looping and copying this
data. The second pattern is still unexplained but we firmly
believe that it is linked to some functions called by memcpy.
The Accuracy and the Error rate of this indicator were
also calculated using the confusion matrix presented in Table
VII. The Accuracy is equal to 0.995 which means that
Fig. 21. Number of executed instructions between two Ret (Legitimate
execution)
Fig. 22. Number of executed instructions between two Ret (Malicious
execution)
the indicator is correct in 99.5% of the cases, this could
be considered as good results compared to other public
detectors[43]. The Error rate is 0.005, this rate reflects the
fact that the results could be wrong in 0.5% of the cases,
which is a very acceptable rate[43].
C. Discussing the results of the thirds indicator: EIP varia-
tion
Figure 24 represents a comparison of the two figures 17
and 18, the red graph represents the malicious execution
while the black graph represents the legitimate execution.
As shown in Figure 24, the malicious and the legitimate
variation start with the exact same patterns, this behaviour is
observed from instruction 0 to around instruction 7K.
When the exploitation process starts around instruction 7k,
the malicious EIP variation witnesses the apparition of new
patterns. More specifically two new clear patterns are being
created:
• Pattern (1): Small variations in the EIP that keeps
repeating and jumping from/to the same addresses. This
pattern starts near instruction 7K and ends near instruc-
tion 42k. This variation represents a big loop being
executed as the same instructions are being executed
several times.
• Pattern (2): A very small random variation at the end
near instruction 43k, this variation is represented by the
scattered red points at the top right side of the figure.
Fig. 23. Zoomed ROP chain
Fig. 24. Comparing the malicious EIP variation with the legitimate
variation
An in-depth inspection was conducted to reveal the causes
behind the apparition of the two patterns. It has been discov-
ered that the first pattern is created by the memcpy function,
which is the vulnerable function being exploited to hijack
the control flow. More specifically, during the exploitation
phase, we introduced 260 characters + Malicious Payload
as an input for the memcpy in order to trigger the overflow,
memcpy is looping to read and copy the 260 characters which
explain the apparition of this pattern. It is also important to
mention that the same behaviour was observed differently
when we tested the second indicator. The deep inspection of
the collected traces revealed that the second pattern is caused
by the execution of the ROP chain itself, it is describing the
EIP jumping from a gadget to another and moving from
instruction to another in the gadgets.
X. CONCLUSION
The findings in this study are subject to at least three
main limitations. The first and the most important limitation
is regarding the third indicator. Although the study has
successfully demonstrated that the first two indicators are
fully capable of identifying ROP attacks at run-time, it has
certain limitations regarding proving the effectiveness of
the third proposed indicator. This indicator still not specific
enough and needs a concrete specification of the IP patterns
that should be used to identify ROP attacks. However, the
analysis of the collected traces was helpful as it revealed
some possible patterns. Future work should focus on study-
ing these possible patterns and analyzing the collected traces
deeply in order to be able to extract the exact IP variation
patterns that could be used to identify ROP attacks.
The second major limitation is regarding the auto-
generated ROP chains used during the experimental phase.
The proposed technique to generate ROP attacks is build-
ing a set of different ROP chains but unfortunately they
are similar from a computational point of view. In other
words, the generated ROP chains are performing the same
computational operations. We think that such similarity may
poison the results obtained during the experimental phase.
Future research should therefore concentrate on studying the
performance of the proposed indicators against real word
ROP attacks instead of using auto-generated attacks.
The third limitation of this study lies in the fact that the
experimental phase was performed using only one vulnerable
program (developed in the lab). In other words, the study
was not able to provide a good diversity of the set of
vulnerable programs. Therefore, caution must be applied,
as the results (e.g. the detecting rate) might not be the
same if a wider set of vulnerable programs is considered.
Therefore, further experimental investigations are needed
to reevaluate the experimental results while considering a
wider set of vulnerable programs. It is also important to
point to an important issue that was not addressed in this
study, this issue is about inspecting the causes of the false
positive alerts observed during the experimental phase. It
was not possible to investigate the real causes of these
alerts as it is considered out of the scope of this research
work, however, it is recommended that further research be
undertaken to investigate these causes as this would help us
to first establish a greater degree of accuracy and second
improve performance of the proposed solution.
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